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Death, Life, and Uncertainty: Allocating the
Risk of Error in the Decision To Terminate Life
Support
In re Conservatorship of Wendland, Prob. Case No. 65669 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997 & Mar. 9, 1998), appeal pend'g, No. C029439 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
On September 29, 1993, forty-two-year-old Robert Wendland flipped
his pickup truck on a highway in Stockton, California. The accident left him
comatose with severe head injuries. After languishing in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS) for sixteen months, Robert began to show signs of
cognitive responsiveness. He regained the ability to pick up designated
objects with his left hand, to make some voluntary movements, and
occasionally to respond to yes-or-no questions. His progress leveled off,
however, in mid-1995. He now exists in what physicians refer to as a
"minimally conscious state" (MCS)-a condition between sapient
consciousness and PVS. Although not comatose, he remains severely brain
damaged, partially paralyzed, dependent upon others for all of his needs,
unable to communicate, and reliant upon artificial nutrition and hydration.'
On at least two occasions prior to his accident, Robert told his wife,
Rose, that he would not want to live in a state of incapacitation and total
dependence on others. Because of Robert's previously expressed wishes
and his poor prognosis, in August 1995 Rose asked his physicians to
remove his feeding tube. The physicians and the hospital's bioethics
committee agreed, but Robert's estranged mother and sister intervened and
obtained a restraining order, arguing that Robert would not have wanted to
die. Thus began four years of legal maneuvering holding Robert's life in the
balance.
After a lengthy hearing, in March 1998 the court denied Rose's petition
to terminate life-sustaining treatment. In the first part of its bifurcated
decision, the court ruled that Rose had the burden of proving through "clear
and convincing" evidence that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
1. See In re Conservatorship of Wendland (Wendland 1/). Prob. Case No. 65669. slip op. at 5
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 1998). appeal pend'g, No. C029439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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hydration would be in Robert's "best interests." The court chose this
"tempered best interests" standard for surrogate decisionmaking over the
"substituted judgment" and "pure subjective" standards, which would
have mandated that the surrogate decide on the primary or sole basis,
respectively, of what the patient would have wanted. While noting that
Robert's previously expressed wishes "may be included in the
decisionmaking process" under the best interests standard, the court made
clear that the basis for decision is "what is objectively best for the
patient."3 In its second ruling, the court found that Rose had not established
by clear and convincing evidence either that Robert would have wanted to
die in this situation or that the termination of life-sustaining treatment was
in his best interests.4 The court appeared troubled by its own ruling, but
concluded that "if it must err, it must err on the side of caution." 5
The Wendland court's ruling is deeply troubling, reflecting a
misapprehension of the medical realities of the minimally conscious state
and the legal interests that follow therefrom. Both Wendland and a factually
similar Michigan case that predated it, In re Martin,6 involved a judicial
decision to err on the side of life. While the court's nearly irrebuttable
presumption in favor of life may be reasonable when applied to patients in a
persistent vegetative state, who cannot experience pain, suffering, or
degradation, it presents a grave risk of harm to patients in a minimally
conscious state, who can. Both the substantive decisionmaking standard
adopted by the Wendland court-the best interests test-and the evidentiary
standard-clear and convincing evidence-are unsuitable standards for
decisionmaking when the patient is in a minimally conscious state.
I
The Wendland case presents a question of first impression in California,
but when considered in conjunction with Martin and a recent Wisconsin
case,7 suggests "an emerging judicial trend to distinguish" PVS from
MCS. 8 Wendland has significant implications for this incipient movement,
as the court held that stricter standards should apply to petitions seeking to
terminate life support for MCS patients than to petitions concerning PVS
patients.
3. In re Conservatorship of Wendland (Wendland 1), Prob. Case No. 65669, slip op. at 1I. 17
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997), appeal pend'g, No. C029439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
4. See Wendland H, slip op. at 3.
5. Id. at 5.
6. 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
7. See Spahn v. Eisenberg (In re Guardianship of Edna M.F.), 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
8. Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E. Cranford, Michael Martin and Robert Wendland: Beyond
the Vegetative State, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 427,431 (1999).
636 [Vol. 109: 635
Case Note
The question of how medical decisions for MCS patients ought to be
made is likely to recur in the courts with increasing frequency because
MCS is emerging as a recognized medical classification.9 A recent
conference of neurological specialists produced a consensus statement
identifying MCS as a distinct clinical syndrome, different in many respects
from PVS.10 Their report defines MCS as a condition in which one or more
of the following clinical features are clearly observable "on a reproducible
or sustained basis": (1) following simple commands; (2) making verbal or
nonverbal "yes-no" responses to questions (regardless of accuracy); (3)
making intelligible verbalizations; and (4) making movements or displaying
behaviors that are clearly responses to environmental stimuli." In contrast,
patients in PVS are permanently unconscious; they have no cognitive
functioning.
12
The most ethically significant feature of MCS is that MCS patients,
unlike PVS patients, can experience pain and suffering.' 3 They may suffer
from a number of painful medical complications that commonly arise from
prolonged immobilization. 4 Additionally, although MCS patients have
varying degrees of self-awareness, some patients appear to be aware of their
physical condition and able to experience humiliation and degradation from
their uncontrolled bodily functions and their total dependence on others. 5
Thus, there are several clinical characteristics of MCS that distinguish it
from PVS. As this medical consensus grows, so too will the momentum
pushing courts to distinguish between the two conditions when articulating
legal standards for decisions to terminate life support. Because Wendland is
9. See, e.g., Ronald E. Cranford, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Ethical
Implications, GERIATRICS, Sept. 1998, at S70; Nelson & Cranford, supra note 8. at 428 (citing
Joseph Giacino et al., Development of Practice Guidelines for Assessment and Management of the
Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 12 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABILrrATION 79 (1997)).
10. See Nelson & Cranford, supra note 8, at 428 (citing ASPEN NEUROBEHAVIORAL
CONFERENCE WORK GROUP, ASSESSMENT, PROGNOSIS AND TREAmItENT OF THE VEGETATIvE
AND MINIMALLY CONSCIOUS STATES: THE ASPEN NEUROBEHAVIORAL CONFERENCE
CONSENSUS STATEMENT (forthcoming 1999)).
11. See id.
12- See Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State
(pt. 1), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1500 (1994).
13. See Cranford, supra note 9, at S72; Kristi E. Schrode, Comment. Life in Limbo: Revising
Policiesfor Permanently Unconscious Patients, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1609, 1638 (1995).
14. See Cranford, supra note 9, at 572. Among the medical conditions an MCS patient may
experience are spasticity and contractures, bedsores and other forms of skin breakdown, urinary
tract infections, bronchial infections, and dental problems. In addition, the insertion and
maintenance of urinary catheters and feeding tubes may be painful and may give rise to other
medical problems. See Robert J. Sullivan, Accepting Death Without Artificial Nutrition or
Hydration, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 220, 220 (1993): see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the
California Medical Association in Support of Appellants at 28. Wendland (No. C029439)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (listing 15 medical complications from feeding tubes).
15. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 14, at 28 (noting that "[tlhe minimally conscious
patient may also suffer other torments," including confusion, disorientation, and frustration);
Cranford, supra note 9, at S72.
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the first case to address this distinction in depth, its ruling will have a
profound impact on this developing area of jurisprudence-which will
determine who will live and who will die. 16
II
The Wendland court adopted standards for terminating life support that
not only are ill-suited to the clinical situation of patients in MCS, but that
also undervalue those patients' interest in avoiding the burdens of continued
treatment. The court failed to recognize that because individuals in MCS
are capable of feeling pain and suffering, a presumption in favor of
continued treatment exposes MCS patients to harm that cannot be
experienced by PVS patients. This consideration militates against
imposition of both of the legal standards espoused by the Wendland court:
the best interests standard and the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
Each of these standards is considered in turn.
Courts and bioethicists have recognized three possible substantive
standards for surrogate decisionmaking concerning end-of-life care: the best
interests standard, the pure subjective standard, and the substituted
judgment standard. The best interests standard calls for the surrogate to
make decisions based on "such factors as the relief of suffering, the
preservation or restoration of functioning[,] and the quality as well as the
extent of life sustained," as well as the impact of the decision on the
patient's loved ones. 7 In contrast, the pure subjective standard calls for the
surrogate to draw solely on the prior expressed wishes of the patient. If
there is insufficient evidence of the patient's preferences, then the surrogate
is not permitted to withdraw life support under any circumstances.
The substituted judgment standard takes a middle course, allowing the
surrogate to form her own conclusion about what the patient would have
wanted from his prior statements or, if he has not explicitly expressed a
preference, from what the surrogate knows about the patient's values,
16. It is possible that the Wendland appeal will be decided on a narrow issue of statutory
construction: whether § 2355 of the California Probate Code, which provides that conservators
have the authority to make medical decisions for conservatees, encompasses the power to
terminate life support for a conservatee in MCS. If Rose Wendland succeeds in persuading the
appellate court that it does, then she will be required to show only that her decision to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration was made "in good faith." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (West
1999). While Wendland's outcome thus may turn on statutory interpretation, the broader policy
issues the case raises have relevance for future litigation in other jurisdictions.
17. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Ct. App. 1983). The Wendland court
invoked this definition from Barber but modified it by suggesting that the determination should be
"tempered" with "subjective" considerations of what the patient would have wanted. Wendland
I, slip op. at 16. However, since the court said only that the patient's wishes "may be included"
along with other factors, id. at 17 (emphasis added), its tempered best interest standard is quite
different from the substituted judgment standard, which is based solely on the surrogate's
determination of the patient's own preferences.
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beliefs, personality, and prior lifestyle. The substituted judgment standard
seeks to preserve the patient's right of self-determination after
incompetency by placing the patient's own preferences at center stage, but
also recognizes that it is the exceptional case in which the patient has
previously articulated his wishes through clear and specific instructions.
The Wendland court erred in selecting the best interests standard. The
best interests test requires the surrogate to ask questions that, for MCS
patients, are unanswerable. Medical science has determined that MCS
patients, unlike PVS patients, are able to feel pain (and pleasure); however,
because they are so limited in their means of expression, no one can be sure
to what extent a particular MCS patient is experiencing pain, suffering, and
humiliation (or joy, pleasure, and contentment)."8 These are precisely the
factors upon which the best interests test is based. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding the experience of patients in MCS, the best
interests of those patients are indeterminable. The best interests test
encourages surrogates faced with this uncertainty to project their own fears,
hopes, and prejudices onto the patient and to make a decision on the basis
of speculation about what he might be feeling.
III
Wendland's requirement that a surrogate provide clear and convincing
evidence is also distressing. The clear-and-convincing standard is extremely
stringent, requiring that the evidence be "so clear as to leave no substantial
doubt," 9 or "sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of
every reasonable mind." ' The court's adoption of this standard was
grounded in a fear that extending to MCS patients the lesser evidentiary
showing adopted by the California courts for PVS patients-a "good faith"
decision 2-would be to start down a slippery slope. It "would certainly
provide the opportunity for unethical conservators of non-communicative
incompetents to try and end the life of patients based on mere
inconvenience, or for personal gain," the trial judge wrote.
This justification is insufficient for two reasons. First, this danger is
equally strong for PVS patients. In fact, since many MCS patients are able
18. Cf. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a
Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance
Instructions, 48 RuTGERS L. REv. 1193, 1230-31 (1996) (noting the difficulties of assessing pain
even in communicative patients).
19. Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193 (1899) (citation omitted).
20. Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 320 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
Sheehan, 126 Cal. at 193).
21. See Drabick v. Drabick (In re Conservatorship of Drabick), 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 201
(C. App. 1988).
22. Wendland I, slip op. at 16.
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to interact in a limited way with loved ones, family members may maintain
stronger emotional attachments to MCS patients than to PVS patients and
thus may be less likely to want to terminate life support. Second, there are a
host of evidentiary standards between "good faith" and "clear and
convincing" with sufficient power to detect cases in which the conservator
has no ground for terminating life support other than her own personal
interests. Selecting the strictest conceivable evidentiary standard is judicial
overkill and entails serious costs in the form of erroneous denials of
petitions to terminate treatment.
Wendland's clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard also evinces a
misunderstanding of MCS. This standard previously has been articulated
and defended in cases involving PVS patients.23 In those cases, the courts
held that patients' strong interest in avoiding an erroneous deprivation of
life resoundingly trumps their interest in avoiding unwanted treatment. That
interest-balancing, however, is predicated on the assumption that the patient
is in PVS. MCS patients, because they are capable of suffering, have a far
stronger interest in avoiding the burdens of continued treatment. This
interest is strong enough to warrant a lower evidentiary standard for
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.
A lower evidentiary standard is necessary in order to enable MCS
patients to avoid the burdens of continued life, because, as a practical
matter, it is impossible for a patient's previously expressed wishes to satisfy
the clear-and-convincing standard if the patient is in MCS. The clear-and-
convincing standard requires highly context-specific evidence of the
patient's prior wishes: Courts typically require that the patient have
envisioned the precise medical situation he is now in when he made the
statement expressing a preference for nontreatment. 24 This standard is
ill-suited to MCS given the wide range of medical situations that fall under
that designation. The degree of presence of the four distinguishing features
of MCS varies dramatically from patient to patient, and a patient need only
display one of these abilities to be classified as MCS. 25 While a person
might be able to foresee himself one day being in a persistent vegetative
state, it is unlikely that he would be able to predict the exact combination of
cognitive and physical abilities and disabilities he might have as an MCS
patient. Thus, the clear-and-convincing standard creates a nearly
insurmountable barrier when applied to MCS patients. Ironically, this was
the very situation that the Wendland court sought to avoid.26
23. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-87 (1989).
24. See, e.g., In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,411 (Mich. 1995).
25. See Nelson & Cranford, supra note 8, at 429.
26. See Wendland I, slip op. at 15 (rejecting the pure subjective standard adopted in the
factually similar Michigan case, In re Martin, on the ground that it effectively precluded anyone
who had not left written instructions from ever forgoing medical treatment after incompetency).
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IV
Because of the uncertainty surrounding MCS, it is not at all obvious
that courts confronted with decisionmaking for these patients should choose
to err on the side of life. Until medical science has a better understanding of
the physical and cognitive experience of MCS patients, there will always be
a large risk of error in decisions to terminate life-sustaining treatment for
these patients. But in choosing what it called "the cautious approach," the
Wendland court misallocated this risk. The court placed such a heavy
burden on the party seeking to terminate treatment that it ensured that
treatment will be continued whenever any degree of uncertainty exists. The
presumption in favor of life may make sense for PVS patients, who are not
affirmatively harmed by continued treatment. But a nearly insurmountable
presumption in favor of life is not appropriate where the patient may be
enduring pain, suffering, and degradation. 7
A better approach would be to allocate the risk of error more evenly
between the parties by adopting a "loose substituted judgment" standard2
The substantive basis for decisionmaking under this standard is what the
surrogate believes the patient would have wanted, as evidenced by the
patient's prior statements and by what the surrogate knows about the
patient's values, beliefs, attitudes, lifestyle, and life goals. A surrogate
applying this standard should not be required to prove the accuracy of the
putative preference by clear and convincing evidence; rather, a lower
standard, such as a preponderance of the evidence, is appropriate. The best
interests test should be applied only as a last resort when there is no way to
ascertain the patient's wishes. Even in that case, a clear-and-convincing
evidentiary standard should not be applied.
The loose substituted judgment standard has been adopted by a number
27. It might be argued that because MCS patients are capable of experiencing pleasure as
well as pain, the argument for favoring life is stronger for MCS patients than for PVS patients. If
it could be established that a particular MCS patient was living pain-free and experiencing
considerable pleasure, then that patient indeed would have a significant interest in continued life.
But in most cases, one cannot reliably conclude that a particular MCS patient is experiencing
pleasure. The MCS patient in Martin, for example, frequently smiled-but also smiled when told
of his daughter's death. See Andrew J. Broder & Ronald E. Cranford. "Afar); Mary, Quite
Contrary, How Was I to Know?": Michael Martin, Absolute Prescience. and the Right to Die in
Michigan, 72 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 787, 820 (1995). Because of the limited cognitive capacity
of MCS patients, their extreme physical limitations, and the medical complications of
immobilization, it is reasonable to conclude that it is the rare MCS patient for whom the pleasures
of life outweigh its burdens. Given (I) the indeterminacy of any one patient's experience. (2) the
statistical likelihood that pain and discomfort outweigh pleasure, and (3) the consequence of
erroneously choosing life and damning the patient to what the Wendland court called a "living
hell on earth," Wendland 1, slip op. at 15, the rational decisionmaker operating under this
uncertainty would not adopt a presumption in favor of continued treatment.
28. See generally Cantor, supra note 18, at 1211 (describing this standard).
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of courts.29 Substituted judgment is not uncontroversial, however. '
Empirical studies have found that surrogate decisionmakers often are poor
judges of what family members' treatment preferences would be in various
medical situations,3' and that negative attitudes about illness and disability
expressed by individuals when they are healthy may soften as they age or
when they actually become ill or disabled.32 Thus, critics note, there is a not
insignificant risk of error in relying upon a surrogate's educated guess as to
what the patient would now want were he competent to make medical
decisions. This may be so, but the risk is far less than that of the best
interests standard, which involves mere speculation about the patient's
quality of life and does not require that the surrogate even attempt to
ground the decision in the patient's own autonomous choice. Preferences
expressed prior to incompetency may not be infallible indicators of what
the patient would now choose, but they should at least establish a rebuttable
presumption regarding that choice.
Adoption of the substituted judgment standard would reduce the
uncertainty surrounding terminal care decisionmaking. Unlike the
quality-of-life considerations upon which the best interests test is based, the
subjective considerations that form the basis for substituted judgment are
usually ascertainable to at least some extent. If the patient has not executed
a written advance directive or orally expressed some preference concerning
end-of-life care, the surrogate can at least infer hi s preferences from
knowledge of his values and beliefs. If even that information is not helpful,
then the surrogate may make an educated guess about the patient's best
interests. But why start with this guess, rather than using it as a last resort?
The Wendland court erred in its allocation of the risk of error between
the parties, undervaluing MCS patients' strong interest in avoiding the
burdens of continued life. A loose substituted judgment standard would
acknowledge, as the Wendland court did, that PVS and MCS are different.
But it would also recognize what the Wendland court failed to see: that
MCS patients deserve more judicial protection of their liberty interest in
refusing unwanted treatment-not less.
-Michelle M. Mello
29. See id. at 1212 n.68 (citing cases from six states).
30. See id. at 1216-17 (summarizing common criticisms).
31. See, e.g., Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy
Predictions?, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 95 (1991); Jeremiah Suhl et al., Myth of
Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Support Is Unreliable. 154
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 90, 94 (1994).
32. See, e.g., Shah Ebrahim et al., The Valuation of States of Ill-Health: The Impact of Age
and Disability, 20 AGE & AGEING 37 (1991).
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